# Verify wallet downloads with signatures and checksums

> Check that a wallet download is genuine before you install it, with real outputs from verifying Electrum, Feather Wallet, Tails and the Ian Coleman BIP39 tool.

Source: https://withoutkyc.to/knowledge-base/security/verify-wallet-downloads/
Updated: 2026-11-15

A fake wallet looks exactly like the real one, until it sends your funds to someone else. Open-source wallet projects sign their releases so you can prove a file came from them. This guide shows the two methods with real outputs from November 2026.

## Two ways to verify

| Method | Proves | How |
|---|---|---|
| **Checksum** (SHA-256 hash) | The file wasn't corrupted or swapped, *if* you got the hash from a trusted place | Compare the file's hash with the published hash |
| **Signature** (OpenPGP) | The file was signed by the developer's key | Verify the `.asc` or `.sig` file with the developer's public key |

A signature is stronger: an attacker who replaces the download on a website can also replace a hash next to it, but can't produce a valid signature without the developer's private key.

## Verify a signature with gpg

You need `gpg`, the standard open-source signature tool (included in most operating systems' package managers), the download, its signature file and the developer's public key.

### Electrum 4.8.4

```bash
gpg --import ThomasV.asc
gpg --verify electrum-4.8.4-x86_64.AppImage.ThomasV.asc electrum-4.8.4-x86_64.AppImage
```

```text
gpg: Good signature from "Thomas Voegtlin (https://electrum.org) <thomasv@electrum.org>" [unknown]
gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!
gpg:          There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner.
Primary key fingerprint: 6694 D8DE 7BE8 EE56 31BE  D950 2BD5 824B 7F94 70E6
```

### Feather Wallet 2.9.1

```bash
gpg --import featherwallet.asc
gpg --verify feather-2.9.1.AppImage.asc feather-2.9.1.AppImage
```

```text
gpg: Good signature from "FeatherWallet <dev@featherwallet.org>" [unknown]
Primary key fingerprint: 8185 E158 A333 30C7 FD61  BC0D 1F76 E155 CEFB A71C
```

### Tails 7.17

```bash
gpg --import tails-signing.key
gpg --verify tails-amd64-7.17.iso.sig tails-amd64-7.17.iso
```

```text
gpg: Good signature from "Tails developers <tails@tails.net>" [unknown]
Primary key fingerprint: A490 D0F4 D311 A415 3E2B  B7CA DBB8 02B2 58AC D84F
     Subkey fingerprint: CEB3 6DE7 8572 8E70 8F59  3B75 C69F F0E4 C08F 8209
```

## How to read the output

- **"Good signature"**: the file matches the signature and the key. If you see "BAD signature", delete the file.
- **"Primary key fingerprint"**: compare it with the fingerprint the project publishes in several places (its website, its source repository, past announcements). An attacker could create a key with the same *name*, never with the same fingerprint.
- **"This key is not certified with a trusted signature"**: normal. It only means you haven't personally certified the key in your own keyring. The fingerprint check is what matters.

## Verify a checksum

```bash
sha256sum electrum-4.8.4-x86_64.AppImage
```

```text
199b1b3cc6bfc29cb771ca14ec7bb1aff1dcfcb01f5049030aa6a49e336f67af  electrum-4.8.4-x86_64.AppImage
```

Compare all 64 characters with the hash the project publishes, ideally in a signed list.

## Verify a web tool by building it yourself

Single-file tools like the [Ian Coleman BIP39 tool](https://withoutkyc.to/knowledge-base/security/air-gapped-paper-wallet-ian-coleman/) can be checked by rebuilding them from source. We built version 0.5.6 from its public source code with the project's own `compile.py` and compared it with the file served at `iancoleman.io/bip39`:

```text
129b03505824879b8a4429576e3de6951c8599644c1afcaae80840f79237695a  bip39-standalone.html  (built from source)
129b03505824879b8a4429576e3de6951c8599644c1afcaae80840f79237695a  bip39.html             (downloaded)
```

Identical hashes mean the published file is exactly the open-source code.

## Mobile apps and browser extensions

App stores and extension stores sign packages themselves, so you can't verify them this way. Protect yourself by reaching the store **from the wallet's official website** (typed by you), checking the publisher name and the number of users, and avoiding look-alike apps.

## Frequently asked questions

### Do I need to verify every update?

Yes, for desktop wallets you download manually. It takes a minute once you have the key imported.

### Where do I get the developer's key safely?

From more than one independent source: the project website, its source code repository and keyservers. If all agree on the fingerprint, you can trust it.

### What if verification fails?

Don't run the file. Delete it, download again from the official site, and verify again. If it still fails, ask the project through its official channels.
