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Security and cold storage

Verify wallet downloads with signatures and checksums

Check that a wallet download is genuine before you install it, with real outputs from verifying Electrum, Feather Wallet, Tails and the Ian Coleman BIP39 tool.

3 min readUpdated Advanced
On this page
  1. Two ways to verify
  2. Verify a signature with gpg
  3. How to read the output
  4. Verify a checksum
  5. Verify a web tool by building it yourself
  6. Mobile apps and browser extensions
  7. Frequently asked questions

A fake wallet looks exactly like the real one, until it sends your funds to someone else. Open-source wallet projects sign their releases so you can prove a file came from them. This guide shows the two methods with real outputs from November 2026.

Two ways to verify

MethodProvesHow
Checksum (SHA-256 hash)The file wasn't corrupted or swapped, if you got the hash from a trusted placeCompare the file's hash with the published hash
Signature (OpenPGP)The file was signed by the developer's keyVerify the .asc or .sig file with the developer's public key

A signature is stronger: an attacker who replaces the download on a website can also replace a hash next to it, but can't produce a valid signature without the developer's private key.

Verify a signature with gpg

You need gpg, the standard open-source signature tool (included in most operating systems' package managers), the download, its signature file and the developer's public key.

Electrum 4.8.4

bash
gpg --import ThomasV.asc
gpg --verify electrum-4.8.4-x86_64.AppImage.ThomasV.asc electrum-4.8.4-x86_64.AppImage
text
gpg: Good signature from "Thomas Voegtlin (https://electrum.org) <[email protected]>" [unknown]
gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!
gpg:          There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner.
Primary key fingerprint: 6694 D8DE 7BE8 EE56 31BE  D950 2BD5 824B 7F94 70E6

Feather Wallet 2.9.1

bash
gpg --import featherwallet.asc
gpg --verify feather-2.9.1.AppImage.asc feather-2.9.1.AppImage
text
gpg: Good signature from "FeatherWallet <[email protected]>" [unknown]
Primary key fingerprint: 8185 E158 A333 30C7 FD61  BC0D 1F76 E155 CEFB A71C

Tails 7.17

bash
gpg --import tails-signing.key
gpg --verify tails-amd64-7.17.iso.sig tails-amd64-7.17.iso
text
gpg: Good signature from "Tails developers <[email protected]>" [unknown]
Primary key fingerprint: A490 D0F4 D311 A415 3E2B  B7CA DBB8 02B2 58AC D84F
     Subkey fingerprint: CEB3 6DE7 8572 8E70 8F59  3B75 C69F F0E4 C08F 8209

How to read the output

  • "Good signature": the file matches the signature and the key. If you see "BAD signature", delete the file.
  • "Primary key fingerprint": compare it with the fingerprint the project publishes in several places (its website, its source repository, past announcements). An attacker could create a key with the same name, never with the same fingerprint.
  • "This key is not certified with a trusted signature": normal. It only means you haven't personally certified the key in your own keyring. The fingerprint check is what matters.

Verify a checksum

bash
sha256sum electrum-4.8.4-x86_64.AppImage
text
199b1b3cc6bfc29cb771ca14ec7bb1aff1dcfcb01f5049030aa6a49e336f67af  electrum-4.8.4-x86_64.AppImage

Compare all 64 characters with the hash the project publishes, ideally in a signed list.

Verify a web tool by building it yourself

Single-file tools like the Ian Coleman BIP39 tool can be checked by rebuilding them from source. We built version 0.5.6 from its public source code with the project's own compile.py and compared it with the file served at iancoleman.io/bip39:

text
129b03505824879b8a4429576e3de6951c8599644c1afcaae80840f79237695a  bip39-standalone.html  (built from source)
129b03505824879b8a4429576e3de6951c8599644c1afcaae80840f79237695a  bip39.html             (downloaded)

Identical hashes mean the published file is exactly the open-source code.

Mobile apps and browser extensions

App stores and extension stores sign packages themselves, so you can't verify them this way. Protect yourself by reaching the store from the wallet's official website (typed by you), checking the publisher name and the number of users, and avoiding look-alike apps.

Frequently asked questions

Do I need to verify every update?

Yes, for desktop wallets you download manually. It takes a minute once you have the key imported.

Where do I get the developer's key safely?

From more than one independent source: the project website, its source code repository and keyservers. If all agree on the fingerprint, you can trust it.

What if verification fails?

Don't run the file. Delete it, download again from the official site, and verify again. If it still fails, ask the project through its official channels.

This guide is also available as Markdown for AI assistants and offline reading.